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Abstract 
The paper uses micro-level data obtained from surveying informal and formal small textile producers in 
Bolivia to estimate the economic returns to social capital. Social capital is defined as being linked to other 
individuals. The paper studies forms of social links that vary with respect to their inclusiveness and their 
ability to enforce cooperation. The paper shows, first, that social capital has an economic return for 
informal firms but not for formal ones. Informal firms operate without the shadow of courts in an 
environment that is characterized by a lack of anonymous trust which makes self-enforcing social links 
valuable. Second, more inclusive social capital generates a higher return as long as the self-enforcement 
constraint is met. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the “strength of weak ties”- argument advanced 
by scholars such as Granovetter, Putnam, and Fukuyama has to be complemented by the game-theoretic 
condition requiring exchange among linked players to be (self)-enforceable.  
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1.  Introduction 
There is a growing acceptance among social scientists that social capital – broadly 
defined as being linked to other individuals – matters. But exactly how it matters – and by 
how much – is less clear. The present paper contributes to this inquiry by using micro-
level data from a survey conducted among small formal and informal textile producers in 
La Paz and El Alto in Bolivia. 
Empirical evidence about the value of social capital is ambiguous, and there are also 
differing theoretical views regarding the underlying mechanisms generating the benefits 
that are associated with social capital.
1 Many approaches emphasize the function of social 
links in providing information that is relevant for business. Social capital affects 
economic outcomes by affecting the level of knowledge (human capital) available for an 
economic activity. According to this view, loose or inclusive forms of social links are 
more beneficial than more closed or exclusive forms of social links because the 
information exchanged between individuals who are only loosely linked is less likely to 
have redundant content. Or put more generally: Inclusive social capital generates higher 
exchange surpluses than exclusive social capital. This idea has been strongly advanced by 
many scholars, including Granovetter (1973), who stresses the advantage of “weak ties” 
over “strong ties”; Putnam (2000, p. 22), who distinguishes between “bridging” and 
“bonding” social capital; and Fukuyama (1995, p. 27), who points to the benefits of 
                                                 
1   Some argue that these benefits are not necessarily Pareto optimal for the overall economy because 
organized groups may conspire against unorganized groups making them worse off (Olson 1982). For 
example, Adam Smith pointed to the danger of a “conspiracy against the public” that may occur if 
“people of the same trade” meet with each other (quoted in Granovetter 1985, p. 484). For a survey of 
the literature on social capital see Woolcock (1998) and Sobel (2002).   3
“spontaneous sociability” over more traditional forms of social capital that are associated 
with family membership or ethnicity. These theories lead to the prediction that the more 
social ties a player has, and the more inclusive these ties are, the better will be the 
economic performance of the player.  
The economic approach to social capital emphasizes the importance of wide social 
networks, but adds the game-theoretic constraint that exchange of information and other 
goods is (self-) enforceable (see Woodruff 1998, Fafchamps 1996, Greif 1994, McMillan 
and Woodruff 1999, Annen 2003). Problems of moral hazard or asymmetric information 
may prevent players from realizing exchange surpluses. The game-theoretic approach 
emphasizes the role of social networks in enforcing cooperative strategies via repeated 
play and effective information sharing. In Annen (2003), I present a theory of optimal 
social networks, where optimality is determined by the degree of inclusiveness that 
maximizes exchange surplus subject to the constraint that exchange in the network is 
self-enforcing.
2  
While this idea can be easily described in theory, it is more difficult to detect empirically. 
One of the reasons is that cooperation may be supported by various mechanisms other 
than social linkage. Formal institutions such as the threat of punishment by courts and 
police on the one hand, and anonymous trust
3 on the other are two other ways to enforce 
cooperation in exchange relationships. In most cases, it is difficult to attribute successful 
cooperation among players to one specific mechanism since all mechanisms are present 
                                                 
2   In Annen (2004), I analyze incentive problems related to communication in social networks such as 
slander and false denial.  
3   The term “anonymous trust” refers to trust among strangers as opposed to “specific trust” which refers 
to trust among players, who personally know each other (social linkage). Anonymous trust is a valuable 
resource in an economy as suggested by cross-country estimates (Knack and Keefer 1997).   4
at the same time. This complexity makes it difficult to get a clear understanding of the 
exact role of social links in generating economic benefits. Fortunately, the data used in 
this paper allows for a differentiation among the types of enforcement: 
1)  The sample consists of 45 formal and 100 informal textile producers in La Paz and El 
Alto in Bolivia. Thus, two thirds of the firms in the sample are informal – that is, they 
are not registered with the tax authorities. These firms cannot rely on formal 
institutions for the enforcement of contracts and the protection of their property. 
These firms operate without the shadow of the courts. This paper draws on a rather 
unique data set in which most of the sampled firms are informal.
4  
2)  Another characteristic of the sample is that the small-firm sector in Bolivia is 
characterized by a surprisingly low level of anonymous trust. The average assessment 
of the trustworthiness of unknown persons expressed on a scale between 1 (not at all 
trustworthy) and 10 (very trustworthy) is 2.74.
 5 And even more strikingly, 40% of the 
respondents indicate that one cannot trust unknown persons at all by responding with 
“1” to this question. 
As a result one can expect that social links that satisfy the (self)-enforceability constraint 
are a particularly scarce – and, thus, a valuable resource – for informal firms. Informal 
firms cannot draw on formal institutions nor on anonymous trust for enforcement. 
Furthermore, one can expect that a reliable exchange structure due to social linkage is 
more valuable for informal firms than for formal ones since the latter can overcome 
moral hazard by the threat to go to police or to use courts. Formal firms are able to rely 
                                                 
4   To get a hold of these firms is not straightforward. Section 3 gives the details regarding the sampling 
method.  
5   The interval estimate with a 1% significance level is [2.322, 3.154].   5
on enforcement mechanisms that support exchange in more anonymous exchange-
relationships making social linkage less valuable. According to this prediction, the paper 
finds that the forms of social capital considered here generate economic returns for 
informal firms but not for formal ones. Evidence indicates that formal firms are involved 
in business transactions that are more anonymous in its nature. 
Second, one can expect that according to the game-theoretic view more inclusive social 
links generate a higher economic return than less inclusive social links as long as the 
(self)-enforceability constraint is met. According to this prediction, the paper shows that 
for informal firms the economic returns to social capital increase for lower levels of 
inclusiveness of social networks as inclusiveness increases as long as the enforceability 
constraint is met. Once the constraint fails to be met, returns to social capital disappear. 
For the most inclusive form of social capital used here, which is the number of known 
competitors, there is no economic return. There is evidence that indicates that cooperation 
in these relationships is not self-enforceable (see Section 4.3). Thus, informal firms seem 
not to draw any value from simply knowing people, but they draw a value from knowing 
people who are trustworthy and reliable. 
This paper substantiates the claim that enforceability is a necessary ingredient for making 
social links valuable. Such links are particularly valuable in an environment that lacks 
formal institutions and anonymous trust. The point I want to make is very similar to 
Geertz’ (1978) interesting insights about the functioning of the “Bazaar-economy” in 
Sefrou, Morocco. Geertz (1978, p. 29) notes that “in the bazaar information is poor, 
scarce, maldistributed, inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued.” Important is 
that in this setting, the low level of information is not given because of a technical   6
constraint or because of a lack of social linkage but because it is in the participants 
interest “to reduce such ignorance for someone, increase it for someone, or defend 
someone against it.” The exchange of information is a strategic game in itself. Not any 
social link is valuable, but only links that are characterized by trust and trustworthiness.  
Social capital has not only the role of enhancing exchange-surpluses among linked 
players but also the role of securing property rights. This latter role affects the players’ 
incentive to invest in physical and human capital. It is well established that “good” 
(formal) institutions are important because of their positive impact on investments which 
then in return generate higher per capita incomes (Knack and Keefer 1995, Acemoglu et 
al. 2001). By regressing the stock of physical capital on the various forms of social 
capital, it is shown that informal firm owners with more social capital have a higher stock 
of physical capital than the ones with less social capital.
6 Furthermore, in contrast to the 
previous result, inclusiveness is negatively related to the returns to social capital. With 
respect to property rights protection, the most exclusive form of social capital – which is 
close family membership – has the highest return.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines various measures 
of social capital and discusses the theoretical predictions regarding the economic return to 
social capital. Section 3 gives some general descriptions about the textile firms in La Paz 
and El Alto in Bolivia. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 analyses the 
role of social capital in securing property rights. Finally, the paper concludes with 
suggestions for further research. 
                                                 
6   Unfortunately, I do not have data on investments.   7
2.  Thinking about Social Capital 
The paper equates social capital with social linkage. Social capital is measured by the 
number of links a given player maintains to some categories of other players, such as 
family, competitors, etc. Thus, the analysis of the paper focuses on social capital built on 
specific trust rather than on anonymous trust – i.e. trust among strangers. While scholars 
generally agree that social capital built on anonymous trust is a highly valuable resource 
in an economy, there is no such agreement regarding specific trust. Social capital built on 
specific trust is not very well understood. For example, in their cross-country study, 
Knack and Keefer (1997) find a positive relationship between anonymous trust and 
economic growth, but no relationship between associational activity – i.e. social capital 
due to social linkage – and economic growth. The previous discussion identified two 
main factors that may influence the economic value of social links:  
–  First, inclusiveness of social links because inclusiveness increases the potential 
exchange surplus in an exchange relationship, and 
–  second, enforceability of exchange in social links because a potential exchange 
surplus is only realized when exchange is enforceable. 
The paper distinguishes between different forms of social capital that vary along these 
two dimensions. 
2.1  Forms of Social Capital 
The paper distinguishes between four types of social links that vary with respect to their 
degree of openness or inclusiveness. By “openness” or “inclusiveness” I mean the extent 
to which a social link is self-chosen as opposed to being predefined by birth. As indicated 
earlier, inclusiveness affects exchange surplus that can be potentially realized in an   8
exchange relationship. Within a family, the capacities, aptitudes, and talents of the 
members may fail to mesh with the requirements for the specific economic activity 
(Pollak 1985). Furthermore, family links may involve social obligations which may 
negatively impact business. For example, a firm owner is forced to employ his 
unproductive brother because of family pressure. However, it seems plausible that such 
obligations occur less between extended family relationships (cousins, uncles) than close 
family relationships (children, brother, and sister). Typically, the number of extended 
family members is large, and players are more able to choose with whom of the cousins 
and uncles to interact with. Accordingly, I define the size of the close family (children, 
brothers, and sisters) and the size of the extended family living in the same area (cousins 
and uncles) as the two first measures of social capital. Close family is perceived as being 
less inclusive than extended family. It seems evident that self-chosen links such as 
friendships or partnerships are not subject to these limitations or at least to a lower extent. 
A player can choose his or her friends from a large pool of possible candidates such that 
affinities and the requirements for the specific economic activity are more likely to 
match. In addition, social obligations that may intervene with business necessities are less 
likely to occur. Marshall (1938, p. 272) wrote almost a hundred years ago that “there are 
often strong friendships between employers and employed: but neither side likes to feel 
that in case of any disagreeable incident happening between them, they must go on 
rubbing against one another: both sides like to be able easily to break off old associations 
should they become irksome.” 
While exchange surpluses in predefined social links may be lower than in self-chosen 
ones, the self-enforceability constraint may be easier satisfied in the former ones. For   9
example, the theory of repeated games emphasizes the importance of high discount 
factors for the self-enforcement of cooperative strategies. Family relationships, which 
play an important role in developing countries (Hart 1973, Elwert 1980), are expected to 
last one’s whole life. These relationships are characterized by what anthropologists call 
“generalized reciprocity”, which means that people expect exchanges to balance only in 
the long run (Sahlins 1972). Furthermore, family members have the ability to impose 
effective punishments and rewards. First, the intimate knowledge about a player allows 
families to identify weak points of a player. They can use this knowledge for the 
determination of punishments and rewards. Second, the threat of social exclusion gives 
families a powerful instrument to enforce their norms. Humans have the need to belong 
and to be attached to others (Baumeister 1995), and families play an integral part in 
satisfying that need. In a recent paper, La Ferrara (2004) points to the fact that family 
members are dynastically linked so that the action of the parents can fall upon the 
children. To the extent that parents depend on their children’s support, dynastical linkage 
helps to enforce cooperative strategies. One, therefore, can expect that the enforcement 
constraint is more likely to be satisfied in family relationships.  
Among the self-chosen links I investigate, first, links to individuals outside the family 
who are trustworthy and reliable, and, second, links to competitors outside the family 
who may be neighbors, members of an association, or other acquaintances. I asked each 
respondent how many non-family persons he/she knows who are “responsible and 
trustworthy and if these persons give their word, they will comply with it.” For these self-
chosen links, exchange-surpluses can be expected to be high. Furthermore, because the 
element of trust is an explicit part of the question, exchange in these links should be self-  10
enforcing. I also asked each respondent how many non-family competitors he/she knows, 
whether as neighbor, member of a common association, or known by any other means. 
While potential exchange-surpluses from cooperation among competitors are large, the 
self-enforcement constraint is not necessarily met. In fact, Section 4.3 will present 
evidence that suggests that the (self)-enforcement constraint among competitors is not 
met. 
 
Figure 1 – Expected Returns to Social Capital 
Figure 1 summarizes the discussion. The forms of social capital are arranged in order of 
higher inclusiveness from left to right. While “known competitors” is the most inclusive 
form of social capital with a high potential exchange surplus, cooperation in these links is 
not enforceable. 
2.2  Estimating the Economic Returns to Social Capital 
Markets are not perfect. In situations of asymmetric information and moral hazard, social 
capital may be a valuable asset because it may help to overcome these problems. The 
capacity to trade at low costs is an important input factor in any production process. 
Already Marshall (1938, p. 139) recognized when discussing the differences among 
factors of production that “[c]apital consists in a great part of knowledge and 
organization.” He identifies organization as a factor of production. According to 
Close Family Extended  Family Trusted Persons Known Competitors 
Enforceable exchange surplus 
Non-enforceable potential  
exchange surplus 
More Inclusiveness  11
Marshall, organization is important because it helps to exploit the benefits of 
“differentiation” which manifests itself “… in such forms as the division of labour, and 
the development of specialized skill, knowledge and machinery.” (Marshall 1938, p. 241) 
A higher differentiation means a higher interdependence among players which is only 
sustainable in the presence of a reliable exchange structure. The organization of exchange 
is an important part of a firm’s activity, and social capital affects a firm’s organization of 
exchange. Then, a firm’s production function has to be expanded to include social capital 
as an additional factor of production. The output, Y , of a firm not only depends on the 
amount of labor, L, physical capital, K , and human capital, H , but also on the amount 
of social capital, S . Consider a firm’s output to be described by the following Cobb-
Douglass production function,  
δ χ β α S H K L A Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = . 
If there is an economic return to social capital, the partial derivative  S Y ∂ ∂ /  would be 
positive. That is, everything else the same, more social capital leads to higher output. The 
channels through which social capital affects output may be direct or indirect. First, a 
good name may influence a consumer’s decision to do business with this seller. Thus, 
social capital affects demand directly. But social capital may also affect output via the 
supply side. Social capital influences sales indirectly by making production less costly. 
For example, a good name helps to attract better qualified workers, cheaper and better 
quality supplies, and it may lower production costs by having subcontracts with other 
producers. The literature on small-firm clusters emphasizes these supply side related 
benefits (Schmitz 1995). Inter-firm cooperation among small firms allows these firms to 
exploit economies of scale and scope. There is a large body of literature which shows   12
how small-firm sectors can benefit from inter-firm cooperation (Annen 2001). Finally, 
for a firm with a good name, it may be easier to obtain credit, an aspect that is 
particularly important for small firms in developing countries (Karlan 2001, La Ferrara 
2004).  
3.  Survey of Small Textile Producers in Bolivia 
The empirical analysis is carried out with survey data obtained during a field trip in April 
and May in 2002. In this time period, 13 students from the public university in El Alto 
and the private university Católica in La Paz, and myself interviewed 145 small informal 
and formal textile firms. The study was supported by Swisscontact – a well established 
Swiss development agency in Bolivia. 
3.1  Data Collection 
A random selection of small firms is not straightforward to obtain for several reasons: 
First, given the high number of informal firms, there is no centralized registry that keeps 
names and locations of firms. Second, firms are not clustered in one geographical area. 
Firms are dispersed all over El Alto and La Paz, the largest city in Bolivia with a 
population of approximately 1.6 million. Third, informal firms worry about being 
detected by public officials which makes the access to them difficult. These factors 
constituted a serious constraint for constructing a random sample.  
We accessed firms through three different channels: First, I could convince private 
organizations and public institutions that work with firms in the textile sector including 
micro-finance institutions and business associations of textile producers, etc. to provide 
me with their membership directories. From these directories, firms were picked   13
randomly.
7 The support of these organizations – in particular the micro finance 
institutions and the small firms associations – not only helped us to locate firms but also 
to gain the trust of firm owners which is particularly important for informal firms because 
of their fear from tax authorities. About 40% of the firms in the sample were selected in 
this way. 
The second channel to access firms was to find them were they appear in public. As 
indicated earlier, many firms do not have such an appearance at the location where they 
produce because they are informal. However, they appear in public if they sell their 
products. Accordingly, we located firms on markets. This in two ways: First, firms have 
been selected because they have a shop in a specific area. Second, firms have been 
selected because they sell their products on the largest and most important two informal 
markets. About 10% of the firms were selected because they have a sales shop 
somewhere in the streets in La Paz and El Alto. Students entered more or less randomly 
in these shops and asked whether they are willing to give an interview. The wholesale 
market takes place in two specific geographical areas. The biggest market takes place in 
the area around the street called Tumusla. Early in the morning from about 7am to 10 am, 
firms (among which most are informal) sell their products to resellers. The second area is 
the biggest (informal) market in La Paz and El Alto called 16 de Julio which takes place 
                                                 
7   The following organizations provided their membership directories: Idepro (micro finance institution), 
Fie SA (micro finance institution), Federation de Micro y Pequeños Empresarios de La Ciudad de el 
Alto y Provincias (small firm association), Asociación A.P.T.A (small firm association), Asociación 16 
Agosto (small firm association), Palace Sports (small firm association), Asociación Departamental de la 
Pequeña Industria (small firm association), Instituto Boliviano de la Pequeña Industria y Artesanía 
(Ministry of Development), Camex (chamber of export), Senarec (registry of commerce), and Tax 
registry of the city of El Alto.   14
on Thursdays and Sundays in El Alto. Again here, many small informal firms present 
their products for sale. When walking through these two markets, we asked people 
randomly whether they would be willingly to participate in an interview. Many persons 
declined such an interview since mistrust is very high. We have to be aware that this 
introduces a bias towards more trusting persons into our sample. Approximately, 40% of 
the data is generated in this way.  
The third way of selecting firms was selection trough acquaintances. In particular the 
students from the Public University El Alto – where many come from a similar socio-
economic background than the persons we interviewed – had friends and family members 
who work in the textile sector. Approximately, 10% of the data was collected in this 
way.
8  
The questionnaire consisted of 120 questions as a maximum.
9 The average interview took 
about the time of one hour. The respondents were not paid for the interview. 
3.2  Characteristics of the Firms 
The sample consists of 145 small firms. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. The 
average firm has 3.7 workers. Formal firms are larger averaging 4.3 workers compared to 
3.3 for informal firms.
10 A few large garment producers in La Paz making clothing on an 
                                                 
8   I am aware that the sampling method has its limitations. Firms selling at specific locations, being 
member of specific associations, getting micro credits from specific micro credit institutions were more 
likely to be included in the sample than other firms. In this sense, the sample is not truly random. But 
there is no other way to get access to informal firms. 
9   The questionnaire can be requested by the author. 
10   p-value for one-sided test in the difference in means is 0.05.    15
industrial basis were not included in the sample.
11 The average (median) yearly sales is 
US$ 11068.- (4714.-). This number is not very high if one considers that the official 
yearly minimum wage in Bolivia is US$ 804.-. On average, 57% of total sales are directly 
to final consumer. This average with 76% of total sales for formal firms is considerably 
higher than for informal ones that sell on average 49% to final consumers.
12 When firms 
sell to resellers, the quantities exchanged at one time are usually small. Many 
intermediaries buy three dozen pieces or less which they then resell at their sales stand 
somewhere in the city streets.  
Of the sample, 100 firms are informal and 45 are formal. A firm is informal, if it is not 
registered with the tax authorities. Firms that are registered have a RUC number. RUC 
stands for “Registro Unico de Contribuyente”. Only persons having RUC pay taxes. 
There are different tax regimes. In particular, there is a so called “Regimen Simplificado” 
for firms that work with capital of US$ 3000 or less. These firms are taxed on the basis of 
their declared capital.
13 Taxes are paid bimonthly. Larger firms must register in the 
“Regimen General” where the tax is a value-added tax, and, therefore, depends on sales. 
About half of the formal firms in the sample are in the “Regimen Simplificado”. 
The firms produce every kind of clothing, including all kinds of sports wear, jackets 
(leather and cloth), children’s wear, jeans, shirts, custom dresses for ladies and man. 
There are also firms specialized in the production of traditional clothing such as 
                                                 
11   For a recent survey of these firms see the World Bank (2001).  
12   p-value for one-sided test in the difference in means is <0.001. 
13  Tax rates vary between 0.018 and 0.14 per invested dollar per year, depending progressively on total 
investment.   16
traditional skirts called “polleras” according to the Aymara culture. The sector produces a 
large palette of products mostly in the lower quality range. 
The working capital of the firms consists of electric sewing-machines with an average 
(median) value of US$ 4074 (US$ 2000). Most of the firms use two kinds of sewing 
machines: They use industrial sewing machines called “Recta”, and machines for sewing 
the edges called “Overlook”. Only about 20% of the firms own an electric cutting 
machine. The rest of the firms cut the cloth by hand. The average number of machines the 
firms own is 5.2. There is an excess of machines relative to labor which is explained by 
the current economic crises. Many firms have not enough work in order to use all their 
equipment.  
The educational level of the firm owners is surprisingly high. The average informal firm 
owner completed secondary school. The average formal firm owner started higher 
technical school after secondary school. Of the informal firm owners, 13% have 
completed higher education, and of the formal firm owners, 27% have done so. 
Virtually all informal firms (93%) produce in their homes, while 73% of formal firms 
produce in their homes. Informal firms are located all over La Paz and El Alto. They are 
hidden and not visible from the outside of the street for obvious reasons.  
The typical textile producer occupies two to three rooms in his home with two to three 
workers, each working with a sewing machine. There is also a big cutting table, on which 
cloth is cut mostly by hand. The firm owner or a family member sells the produced 
products on a regular bases on local markets such as the one on Tumusla in La Paz or the 
market “16 de Julio” in El Alto, or sell their products to intermediaries that smuggle the   17
products to neighboring countries such as Peru, Argentine, Brazil, or Chile. Only small 
quantities are traded at one time.  
3.3  Fierce Local Competition and a Low Level of Anonymous Trust 
The producers operate in an environment of fierce local competition. Most firms indicate 
that they have more than 500 competitors. When asking the firms about their strongest 
competitor, most of the firm owners indicate that they face the strongest competition 
from other local firms. Many indicate that own family members, neighbors, friends, 
people selling in the same area, or other firms in the same association are the strongest 
competitors. When asking about their production capacities, 36% of the firms responded 
that they “generally do not have much work”, 49% indicate that “generally they have 
work, but they could easily produce more”, 13% indicate that “generally they have a lot 
of work”, and only 2% indicate that they are “generally overburdened with work”. It can 
therefore be concluded that competition among the textile producers is strong. 
Another striking feature of the environment of these firms is a surprisingly low level of 
anonymous trust in the sector. Respondents were asked to assess the anonymous 
trustworthiness of unknown persons on a scale of 1 (not at all trustworthy) to 10 (very 
trustworthy). The mean response was 2.7. Even more strikingly, the most frequent answer 
with 40% of the respondents is 1. Thus, 40% of the responses were “1” (not at all 
trustworthy). In many occasions it was apparent that Bolivian are aware of this. Many 
respondents mentioned in personal conversations that Bolivians do not trust each other 
and that the low level of trust is a big problem among firm owners and Bolivians in 
general.    18
4.  Results 
To estimate the economic returns to social capital, we use the Cobb-Douglass production 
function introduced in Section 2.2 in log form: 
  ε β β β β β + + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3 2 1 S Log H Log K Log L Log Y Log , (1) 
where  ε  denotes the random error. The coefficients  2 β  till  5 β  denote the output 
elasticities of labor (L), working capital (K ), human capital (H ), and social capital (S ) 
respectively. As indicated in the previous section, S  includes various forms of social 
capital. The number of close family members (children, brothers and sisters), the number 
of extended family members (uncles and cousins), the number of trusted non-family 
persons, and the number of known competitors are included as the various forms of social 
capital. These forms can be ranked according to their inclusiveness, whereby close family 
membership is the least and known competitors is the most inclusive form of social 
capital (see Figure 1).  
4.1  Returns to Social Capital for Formal and Informal Firms 
The regression results are presented in Table 2. I estimate the model for formal and 
informal firms separately. It is immediately apparent that social capital affects sales 
differently for formal and informal firms. For formal firms, none of the social capital 
variables is statistically significant. The economic behavior of formal and informal firms 
appears to obey different structural models. The Chow test reported in Table 3 confirms 
this claim.  
This result confirms the prediction that the social links considered here seem not to 
generate any economic value for formal firms. As indicated earlier, the theory predicts 
that formal firms can rely on formal enforcement mechanisms – threat to go to police or   19
use courts – that supports exchange in more anonymous exchange-relationships. There 
are several factors that support this claim: First, Table 2 indicates that formal firms that 
specialize in retailing (high share of sales to final consumer) have higher sales than firms 
that work mainly with intermediaries. This measure is not significant for informal firms. 
Second, firm age is positively associate with sales for formal firms (p-value 0.107), but 
not for informal ones. Firm age is important not only to build working experience 
impacting the capabilities of a firm but also to build a good name in order to establish a 
steady clientele that goes beyond the social linkage captured in the social capital 
variables. Thus, formal firms seem to do their business in more anonymous exchange 
relationships, and the social links considered here have no impact on the performance of 
these firms. For formal firms, reputations matter for business that go beyond the social 
links considered here. 
4.2  Returns to Social Capital and Inclusiveness of Social Links 
For informal firms, two of the four social capital measures are statistically significant. 
Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients for the various forms of social capital. The black 
dots in the graph depict the point estimate for each of the four forms of social capital. It is 
apparent that Figure 2 looks very similar to Figure 1 – which is the figure derived from 
the theoretical predictions. Figure 2 makes clear that social capital returns increase as the 














Figure 2 – Social Capital Value and Inclusiveness of Social Networks 
First, there is no social capital return for the most exclusive form of social capital, the 
number of close family members. The reason may be that close family ties are too strong 
– in the sense of Granovetter – to yield beneficial exchange opportunities. Furthermore, 
these ties may involve social obligations that may run against business interests. Second, 
the number of extended family members is positively associated with sales. The point 
estimate suggests that having 10% more extended family members living in the area 
increases sales by 3.1%. The impact of this form of social capital on sales is higher than 
the one of physical capital. As argued before, social links among extended family are 
more inclusive. In average, respondents indicate to have 17 extended family members in 
the area of La Paz and El Alto while having 6 close family members. Most likely, there is 
more diversity among extended family members, which positively affects exchange 
surpluses.  
Third, the number of trustworthy friends has the highest social capital return. The point 
estimate suggests that having 10% more trustworthy friends will increase sales by 4%.    21
Inclusiveness of these links is higher without that the enforcement constraint fails to be 
met. Note, however, that the point estimates regarding extended family and trusted non-
family members are statistically not different from each other. A Wald test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient for extended family and the coefficient for trusted 
non-family persons are the same (F-statistic 0.322). Finally, the most inclusive form of 
social capital defined as the number of known competitors does not yield any return. The 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. According to the theory developed 
earlier this happens because in these links the enforcement constraint fails to be met. In 
contrast to close family interaction, inter-firm cooperation would generate considerable 
amounts of exchange surpluses.  
These estimates may suffer from endogeneity bias. The social capital estimates could be 
biased because of reversed causality. While the social capital variables related to family 
can be considered as being exogenous in this setup, this is not clear for the other two 
social capital measures. More successful firms may have more trustworthy friends, and/or 
may know more competitors. I did a Hausman test for these two variables using the 
respondents’ immigrant status and the number of fluently spoken languages as an 
instrument for these two variables. Being an immigrant and the number of spoken 
languages is an exogenous variation that positively affects the number of known 
competitors and the number of trustworthy friends. This claim is substantiated by the 
reduced form estimation reported in Table 4. Furthermore, there are good reasons to 
believe that the exclusion restriction is met. I claim that the two instrumental variables 
affect sales via the social capital variables only. The common language on markets is 
Spanish, and this is the language spoken in more anonymous exchange relationships so   22
that the fact of speaking the other two ethnic languages spoken in La Paz does not really 
matter on this level. However, the ability to speak native languages affects the network of 
friends since they have a tendency to segregate along ethnic lines. Somebody speaking 
both ethnical languages Aymara and Quechua in addition to Spanish is able to connect to 
members of both groups. Similarly, being an immigrant affects sales only via social 
linkage. Since immigrants tend to have less family around, they tend to have more social 
links that do not go along family lines.  
The Hausman test reported in Table 4 indicates that there is no endogeneity bias. I, 
therefore, conclude that the OLS estimates reported in Table 2 are not biased. 
4.3  Missing Cooperation among Firms: Slander and Shame of Being 
Cheated 
Figure 1 claims that there is a high potential exchange surplus resulting from inter-firm 
cooperation, but this exchange surplus is not realized because it is not enforceable. As 
indicated earlier, there is a vast amount of unused productions capacities. Part of the low 
usage of capacities is due to the fact that these capacities are uncoordinated. The 
fragmentation and segmentation of the market due to a lack of cooperative practices 
among the firms has the impact that the sector is not able to produce orders that ask for 
large minimum quantities. The capacity to produce large orders is particularly important 
for gaining orders from foreign retail chains. This capacity is not only a matter of scale, 
but also a matter of being able to guarantee a level of quality which is the same across 
firms cooperating with each other, to comply with timetables, etc. I have some anecdotes 
where cooperation failed because firms did not comply with quality agreements. For 
example, a firm owner told me that another firm cooperating with him did sew the cloth   23
with a lower number of stitches than they had previously agreed. In this case, cooperation 
failed. Thus, in the sector there is a large amount of uncoordinated production capacity 
that prevents firms from attracting large orders. Furthermore, there is evidence that there 
is virtually no division of labor across firms and that most of the firms are fully vertically 
integrated and work completely independent. About 25% of the interviewed firms in the 
clothing sector indicate that they sub-contract part of their production. However, the vast 
majority of these firms (80%) indicate that they are sub-contracting part of their 
production only rarely. Only about 20% of these firms (or 5% of all firms in the sample) 
indicate that they are subcontracting all the time. Subcontracting occurs mostly when a 
firm receives an order with a magnitude which this firm is not able to fulfill itself. In this 
sense, subcontracting does not lead to a specialization in production steps across firms.  
This raises the question why these exchange surpluses are not realized. A repeated game 
setting indicates that for cooperation to be sustainable (Folk theorem) in a community of 
players two factors have to be satisfied: First, information about cheating behavior of a 
player has to spread in a community, and second, the communicated information in the 
community has to be accurate. A cheater has to be known as a cheater and punished 
accordingly. Then, a future punishment may deter players from cheating. If the behavior 
of a player is not observed by every player in the community (private monitoring), 
truthful communication among the players is key in order to establish incentives for 
cooperation (Annen 2004). Gossip among players that distorts information removes the 
players’ incentive for cooperation.  
The survey asked several question related to gossip and communication among the firms. 
First, the results show that there is considerable communication among the firms. The   24
picture of a large number of anonymous firms only indirectly linked via market prices is 
misleading. Firms know each other and communicate with each other. However, as it 
turns out, most of the firm owners (69%) have doubts regarding the accuracy of 
information conveyed in gossip. Similar to the “Bazaar Economy” described by Geertz 
(1978), the exchange of information is in itself a strategic game. For example, more than 
half of the respondents indicate that they heard unjustified rumors about their work or 
their person. 31% indicates that they hear such rumors about their own person some 
times, and 13% indicate they heard such rumors all the time. More strikingly, many more 
successful firms indicate to have problems with slander than non-successful ones. 50% of 
the 10% most successful firms according to their sales indicate that they hear unjustified 
rumors all the time, and 30% indicate that they hear them some times. In contrast, only 
4% of the 90% less successful firms indicate that they hear unjustified rumors all the 
time. Thus, successful firms seem to be more confronted with slander than non-successful 
ones. Most of the respondents indicate that competitors slander by giving wrong 
information to clients in order to attract more clients or that competitors slander by giving 
other competitors wrong information.  
A second factor that explains why inter-firm links are not enforceable is that information 
about cheating behavior does not spread easily in the sector. The reason is that players are 
ashamed of being cheated. The knowledge of the lack of anonymous trust in the sector 
leads to a reversal of responsibilities in case of cheating. It is generally known that one 
cannot trust others. Thus, somebody who trusts and gets cheated should have known 
better. Because players are ashamed of being cheated, they are reluctant to pass over this 
information to others. Thus, the lack of anonymous trust directly impacts the   25
sustainability of the mechanism that is based on specific trust. In response to the question 
of to whom they talk if they get cheated, only 16% of the respondents indicate to talk to 
as many persons as possible about this incidence. A surprisingly high number, namely 
33%, indicate that they talk to nobody about such an incidence since it is a private matter. 
51% indicate that they only talk to people that are very close to them, such as family. 
From that we can conclude that the communication of information related to cheating is 
limited in the sector.  
This evidence supports the claim that the self-enforcement constraint for the most 
inclusive form of social capital is not met. Incentives to slander and the limitations 
regarding the communication of information related to cheating are the two factors that 
explain why exchange in inter-firm links is not enforceable.  
5.  Social Capital and Property Rights 
There is a large literature in institutional economics that emphasizes the role of (formal) 
institutions in providing incentives for investment in physical capital and human capital. 
Key is that a formal institutional framework in a given context secures property rights 
and avoids distortionary policies (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Knack and Keefer 1995). Secure 
property rights produce higher saving rates, which in return amount in a higher per capita 
income. This literature studies mainly the role of formal institutions in securing property 
rights. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001, p. 1370) focus on property rights and checks 
against government power, and use the protection against “risk of expropriation” index 
from Political Risk Services as a proxy for institutions. But if formal institutions fail, 
there may be informal substitutes that take over the role of securing property rights. It is 
reasonable to assume that social networks as the one studied here can have this role.   26
Thus, social capital may not only positively influence economic outcomes by increasing 
exchange surpluses but by improving the incentives to invest in physical capital, which in 
return will generate higher incomes.  
Social capital given by close and extended family membership and the other forms of 
social capital as measured here in this study may affect the security of property rights. 
One may expect a firm owner with more social capital to invest more in physical capital 
than a firm owner who has less social capital. Here, inclusiveness of social networks is 
not necessarily an asset regarding their role in securing property rights. Close networks 
may actually be more beneficial for the protection of property rights. 
Informal firms in particular lack formal protection of property rights. As mentioned 
earlier, informal firms are at a disadvantage in using the formal institutions to enforce 
their contracts and protect their property. They must also hide from public officials 
enforcing tax laws and seeking bribes. Some respondents told me that a common practice 
of public officials is to confiscate sewing machines or threaten to do so, with the aim of 
extracting bribes. Security of property is an important problem. Sewing machines are a 
considerable investment (value of about US$ 800 each) for the firm owners. These 
machines can be easily moved and stolen. In case of a robbery, informal firm owners 
cannot go to the police reporting the theft. If there is always somebody around, which is 
more likely when the close family is large, the owners may keep more machines.  
Unfortunately, I do not have data on investment. However, I have data on the stock of 
accumulated investments given by the stock of physical capital owned in each firm. I can 
therefore estimate the stock of physical capital as a function of social capital. When I do 
this, I find significant coefficients for the measures of social capital for informal firms.   27
However, in contrast to the previous section, returns to social capital decrease with 
increasing inclusiveness of social links. Table 5 presents the regression results for 
informal and formal firms. The following insights follow from the result: 
1)  As before, social capital matters only for informal firms but not for formal ones. 
2)  More inclusive forms of social capital have smaller coefficients. For the most 
inclusive form of social capital given by the number of known competitors the 
coefficient is negative and significant. 
Figure 3 graphs the estimated coefficients for informal firms. The dots represent the point 












Figure 3 – Social Capital as Property Rights 
The drawback of not having data on investment is that there are other explanations than 
the “security of property rights argument” that may explain the relationship between 
social capital and physical capital. For example, family members may make physical 
capital available either by lending equipment or by lending money for buying such 
machines. Informal firms have a higher difficulty in obtaining credits. We asked firms 
where they could obtain credit most easily, from family, local business, informal lenders, 
rotating credit associations, micro-credit banks, or regular banks. Among the informal   28
firms, 46% chose family as the best option of getting credit, while 34% of formal firms 
did. This difference is statistically significant (p-value 0.08). To control for this, the 
regression reported in Table 5 includes the variable “informal credit”, a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the respondent indicated that the easiest way of obtaining credit is 
through family, or other forms of informal credit. The coefficient for this dummy variable 
is negative and significant: respondents who indicate informal sources of credit to be 
their best way of getting credit have an about 50% lower stock of physical capital. For 
this reason, I am confident that this alternative story can be ruled out as an explanation 
for the positive relation between social capital and physical capital.  
6.  Conclusions 
The evidence presented here suggests that the “strength of weak ties” argument advanced 
by important scholars such as Granovetter, Putnam, and Fukuyama has to be 
complemented by the game-theoretic condition that exchange among linked players has 
to be self-enforceable. The paper shows that to the extent that exchange among linked 
players is enforceable, social capital matters. The social capital return increases for more 
inclusive forms of social capital. This, however, holds only for informal firms, indicating 
that an inclusive informal exchange structure that is characterized by trust is particularly 
valuable for these firms. Formal firms, in contrast, specialize in transactions that are more 
anonymous in its nature. These kinds of links are not captured by the social capital 
measures used here.  
The most inclusive form of social capital considered here does not generate any return 
because exchange in these relationships is not enforceable. This point differs from the 
result reported by Fafchamps and Minten (2002) on agricultural traders in Madagascar.   29
They measure social capital by the number of known traders and show a strong causal 
positive relationship from social capital to sales. There may be two explanations for the 
difference between the study in Madagascar and the results reported here. First, there 
may be a higher amount of anonymous trust in the setting in Madagascar, and, second, 
competition among the traders may be lower. As shown in the paper, the level of 
anonymous trust in the small-firm sector in Bolivia is strikingly low, and competition 
among the firms is strong.  
Finally, the paper analyses the role of the different forms of social capital in protecting 
property rights affecting the players’ incentive to invest in physical and human capital. 
Again, social capital matters for informal firms only. In contrast to the social capital’s 
function of generating exchange surpluses, more inclusive forms of social capital 
generate a higher return regarding the protection of property rights. 
More has to be known about the underlying mechanisms generating the benefits that are 
usually associated with social capital. For this purpose detailed micro-level data on 
parameters as identified by game-theoretic models on mechanisms of cooperation is 
needed. Further research would benefit tremendously if similar data were available in 
other countries with different cultural backgrounds. In particular, it would be worthwhile 
to investigate the role of social capital and the mechanism behind it in a small-firm sector 
that is more successful than the sector studied here. 
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Descriptive Statistics                                  
   All firms             Informal firms    Formal firms 
    Mean  SD  Median Max  Min   Mean  Median   Mean  Median 
                       
Labor  # of full time and part-time workers  3.65  4.06  2.5  35  0.5    3.34  2.25    4.34  4 
Stock  of  machines  US$  4074.17 7039.08 2000  65800  20   3022.7 1925   6410.8 2200 
Firm  age  Years  9.03  7.16  6  37  1   8.69  5   9.78  9 
Human capital  Levels with 8=completed university  4.06  1.74  4  8  1    3.71  3.5    4.82  4 
Sales  US$  11068.5 17295.4 4714  117143 250  11434  117143   10256  5129 
Sales of sales to final consumer  Sales to final consumers to total sales  0.57  0.4  0.6  1  0    0.49  0.41    0.76  1 
Share longterm labor 
# of labor working for more than one year 
to total labor  0.63  0.41  0.75  1  0    0.6  0.67    0.69  1 
Close family  # of persons  6.39  2.78  6  13  0    6.47  6    6.2  6 
Extended family  # of persons  15.19  27.13  10  300  0    17.11  10    10.91  8 
Number of trusted non-fam. 
Persons  # of persons  5.48  17.24  3  200  0    3.32  3    10.29  2 
Number of known competitors  # of persons  18.06  30.69  7  250  0    16.34  7    21.87  6 
Assessment of anonymous 
trustworthiness 
scale between 1 (not trustworthy) and 10 
(very trustworthy)  2.74  1.93  2  10  1   2.67  2   2.89  2 
Business association  Dummy=1 if member  0.3  0.46  0  1  0    0.38  0    0.13  0 
Female  Dummy=1 if yes  0.44  0.5  0  1  0    0.45  0    0.42  0 
Aymara  Dummy=1 if yes  0.6  0.49  1  1  0    0.7  1    0.38  0 
Immigrant  Dummy=1 if yes  0.45  0.5  0  1  0    0.46  0    0.42  0 
                                      
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics     33
 
Dependent Variable: Sales in Log                    
    Informal Firms    Formal Firms   
    Observations: 100    Observations: 45   
           
Independent Variables:   OLS  S.E.
1   OLS  S.E.
1   
Intercept    2.7*** 0.98    3.44** 1.61   
Labor
3  Log  0.61*** 0.17    0.75*** 0.34   
Stock  of  machines  Log 0.21** 0.1    0.27** 0.12   
Firm  age  Log  0.15 0.12   0.4  0.24  
Human  capital  Log  0.21 0.22   0.06 0.41  
Share sales to final consumer  ratio  0.36  0.3    1.24*  0.61   
Share longterm labor  ratio  0.55**  0.25    -1.15**  0.48   
Size of close family
2  Log  0.01 0.29   0.2  0.44  
Size of extended family
2  Log  0.31***  0.09   -0.14  0.17  
Number of trusted non-fam. Persons
2  Log  0.4***  0.15   0.08 0.13  
Number of known competitors
2  Log  0.05 0.1    0.17 0.13  
Assessment of anonymous trustworthiness  Level  0.14**  0.05    0.13*  0.06   
Business  association  1=yes  0.39*  0.21   -0.49  0.37  
Female  1=yes  0.78***  0.23   -0.07  0.38  
Aymara  1=yes  0.57**  0.24   0.41 0.31  
           
Adjusted  R-Squared    0.46     0.25    
F-Statistic      7.12     2.07    
                       
Table 2 – OLS Production Function Estimation 
*, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; 
1Estimated with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance; 
2Added 1 to these variables in order to avoid a 
loss of data in case of zeros; 
3Labor is measured by the number of workers including the owner. Part-time 
workers are counted half, and family members helping in the firm are excluded in order to avoid double-
counting.  
 
Chow Test: Formal and Informal Firms  
F-statistic 1.58 p-value  0.085
Log likelihood ratio  29.28 p-value  0.022
Table 3 – Chow Test   34
 
          
      
Dependent Variable: Number of trusted non-fam. Persons
2 
     
   Informal  Firms 
   OLS S.E.
1 
Instrumental Variables      
Immigrant 1=yes  0.2  0.14 
Number of fluent languages  Log  0.55*  0.28 
      
R-Squared   0.22   
      
Dependent Variable: Known Competitors
2 
     
      
   Informal  Firms 
   OLS S.E. 
Instrumental Variables      
Immigrant 1=yes  0.5**  0.25 
Number of fluent languages  1=yes  0.41  0.54 
      
R-Squared   0.26   
           
      
      
Hausman Test          
   Informal  Firms 
   OLS S.E. 
      
Resid(Trusted persons)    0.48 0.81 
Resid(Known Competitors)    -0.71 1.21 
    p-value 
F-statistic   0.19 0.82 
Chi-square   0.39 0.82 
      
           
Table 4 – Reduced Form Equation and Hausman Test 
*, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; 
1Estimated with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance; 
2Added 1 to these variables in order to avoid a 
loss of data in case of zeros.    35
 
        
Dependent Variable: Log of Working-capital             
            
    Informal Firms (n=100)    Formal Firms (n=45) 
            
   OLS S.E
1 
  OLS S.E
1 
Independent Variables:            
Intercept   4.69***  0.8    6.24***  1.86 
Labor
3  Log 0.86***  0.16    0.7*  0.41 
Firm age  Log  0.12  0.12    0.25  0.38 
Human capital  Log  0.2  0.23    -0.12  0.66 
Share sales to final consumer  ratio  -0.87***  0.28    -1.45*  0.87 
Share longterm labor  ratio  0.33  0.27    0.8  0.6 
Size of close family
2  Log 0.78***  0.25    0.76  0.58 
Size of extended family
2  Log 0.21*  0.11    0.08  0.25 
Number of trusted non-fam. persons
2  Log 0.02  0.18    -0.13  0.28 
Number of known competitors
2  Log -0.17*  0.09    -0.22  0.19 
Assessment of anonymous trustworthiness  Level  0.03  0.05    0.1  0.1 
Business association  1=yes  -0.16  0.2    0.05  0.71 
Female 1=yes  0.09  0.21    -0.21  0.63 
Aymara 1=yes  0.02  0.24    -0.54  0.58 
Informal Credit  1=yes  -0.59***  0.2    -0.47  0.48 
            
            
            
Adjusted R-Squared    0.47      0.11   
F-Statistic      7.22        1.41    
Table 5 – Social Capital and Stock of Physical Capital 
*, **, and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; 
1Estimated with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance; 
2Added 1 to these variables in order to avoid a 
loss of data in case of zeros; 
3Labor is measured by the number of workers including the owner. Part-time 
workers are counted half, and family members helping in the firm are excluded in order to avoid double-
counting.  
 